'Intentionalist' approaches portray self-deceivers as "akratic believers", subjects who deliberately choose to believe p despite knowing that p is false. In this paper, I argue. that the intentionalist model leads to a series of paradoxes that seem to undermine it. I show that these paradoxes can nevertheless be overcome if we accept the hypothesis that self-deception is a non-intentional process that stems from the influence of emotions on judgment. Furthermore, I propose a motivational interpretation of the phenomenon of 'hyperbolic discounting bias', highlighting the role of emotional biases in akratic behavior. Finally, I argue that we are not the helpless victims of our irrational attitudes, insofar as we have the ability-and arguably the epistemic obligation to-counteract motivational biases.
|Number of pages||15|
|Journal||Croatian journal of philosophy|
|Publication status||Published - 2014|
- epistemic responsibility
- hyperbolic discounting
- motivational biases