TY - JOUR
T1 - Geographic access markets and investments
AU - Bourreau, Marc
AU - Cambini, Carlo
AU - Hoernig, Steffen
N1 - WOS:000357234700002
PY - 2015/6/1
Y1 - 2015/6/1
N2 - We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment.
AB - We analyze the adoption of access regimes that differ according to the prevailing degree of infrastructure competition in different geographical areas of a country. Our results show that, compared to a uniform access price, geographically differentiated access prices improve welfare and incentivize investment. However, when access provision in areas with infrastructure competition is deregulated, welfare might decrease, because multiple inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level emerge, with either too little or too much investment.
KW - Geographical access regulation
KW - Infrastructure investment
KW - Wholesale competition
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84929176225&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.04.003
DO - 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2015.04.003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84929176225
VL - 31
SP - 13
EP - 21
JO - Information Economics and Policy
JF - Information Economics and Policy
SN - 0167-6245
ER -