Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces

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6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large but finite number of players that allows compact metric spaces for both actions and types. We then compare our framework and findings to the early purification theorems of Rashid (1983. Equilibrium points of non-atomic games: asymptotic results. Economics Letters 12, 7-10), Cartwright and Wooders (2002 On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players. University of Warwick Working Paper 686 (revised 2005)), Kalai (2004. Large robust games. Econometrica 72, 1631-1665) and Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2006. Behavioral conformity in games with many players. Games and Economic Behavior 57,347-360). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman theorem. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1302-1311
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume44
Issue number12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2008

Keywords

  • Bayesian games
  • Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
  • Pure strategies
  • Purification

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